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Fig. 1. Francisco Goya’s “The Dream of Reason Produces Monsters.”1 
 




“El sueño de la razón produce monstruos.” 
[The dream of reason produces monsters.] 
















2 I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Elizabeth and Cuauhtémoc, my grandfather, Juan, and my partner 
Guillermo, for being always the support behind the fulfilling of my dreams. I also want to thank my 
supervisors, Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and Patrick Shirreff, as well as professors Indrek Lõbus and Alex Davies, 
and my colleague Nikolai Shurakov, for their vital contributions to the present work.  
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1. Introduction: Monsters Within  
In his seminal work on demonstratives, David Kaplan (1989) banned monsters from the realm of 
natural language semantics. One of the main reasons behind his and other subsequent crusades 
against monsters is that their mere existence poses a threat to one of the foundational principles of 
truth-conditional semantics, namely, the Principle of Compositionality.  
To cast such disastrous creatures out, Kaplan argued that the English language does not contain 
operators that operate on linguistic character and, furthermore, that such operators could not be 
added to it. The first claim has been disputed since, giving rise to a monster hunt that led to the 
discovery of alleged monsters in a number of natural languages, and even to monstrous expressions 
in English. However, the second claim—that they cannot be added to English—seems to have 
been ignored or, at least, only indirectly refuted by some of the responses to the first one. The goal 
of this paper is to offer a counterexample to that second assertion: the thesis that monsters could 
not be added to English. I claim not only that there are monsters, but that we can introduce monsters into the 
English language.  
Hence, this is an essay about the possibility of implementing character operators into the 
English language, something that so far has not been explicitly addressed in the contemporary 
debate about monsters3. In order to do so, I first provide a monstrous taxonomy to answer the 
question: what it is to be a monster? This is covered in the first section, Monsters Within, where 
I offer the background required to understand what monsters are and why we should care about 
them. Then, in section number two, Of Monsters and Children, I point to a very particularly 
mischievous monster that terrorises children in the lands of Mexico—the Little Sherry Bottle 
Operator, an indexical shifter that swaps the referents of ‘I’ and ‘you’—giving a superficial 
characterisation of it, and, finally,  in section number three, Monster Trials, I set out its insidious 
character by showing how it is immune to a number of arguments that have been brought forward 
to explain away other cases of (putative) monsters by dismissing them as either as quotation devices,  
implicature triggers, character or meaning shifters or overall an artificial linguistic practices. The last  
and briefest section, More Than a Children’s Game, works as conclusion by summarising the 
argument that since the rules of the Little Sherry Bottle game as well as the truth conditions of its 
 
3 A notable exception can be found in Rabern 2019.  
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operator make sense not only in the Mexican variety of the Spanish language but also in English, 
one can easily imagine how simple it would be to teach exactly the same game to English-speaking 
children, and by virtue of doing so, introduce a monster into the English language. The moral of 
this paper, then, is that we only need a bit of wicked, child-like imagination in order to bring 
monsters to life in English.  
1.1.  The Principle of the Compositionality of Meaning  
How is it possible that we can understand sentences we have never encountered before? How is it 
that a finite, even limited, vocabulary, can still give rise to a possibly infinite number of sentences? 
Think about the following one: “The brown matryoshka with the face of Alexander Pushkin casts 
a shadow on the photograph of Pina playing in the snow last year.” Try googling it, I doubt you 
that will find an exact match. Nevertheless, this completely novel sentence that describes part of 
the shelf I have in front of me, though unknown to you until know, is still understandable; odd, 
maybe, but not meaningless. This is because language has the capacity to produce a virtually infinite 
number of well-formed, meaningful sentences, out a finite number of words. If sentences are built 
out of words just like Lego castles are built out of Lego blocks, then there must be something 
special with these word-blocks, for you can assemble immensely large and complex structures out 
of a basic starter set: you can run out of new blocks yet keep building new castles! We acquire this 
basic set and a manual that tells us how to put them together as children, and of course, on the 
course of our lives we keep collecting new blocks, sometimes fancy new words that we learn at 
school or by reading poetry, but we certainly don’t learn an infinity of them, just a relatively small 
number that we can add to our starter-set. Moreover, we can also acquire other basic sets: foreign 
languages with their owns words and their own rules of combination, and they also allow us to 
make as many castles as we can imagine! But how does it work? 
An explanation of this intriguing feature of human language—its infinite productivity—can be 
found in what is known as the Principle of Compositionality, which tells us that: 
Compositionality: There is a function that maps the complete structure and the meanings 




It purports to explain how is it that we, as language users, can understand the meaning of a complex 
expression based on the knowledge we have of the words that constitute it, for instance: “Juanito 
and Pedrito are really good friends and they all like to play football with Kaija after school when it 
is not too hot outside”. If we can understand this sentence is because we know what the words that 
make it up mean, and also, because we know how they are ordered or structured: we know that a 
sentence usually has a subject and a predicate, and that a predicate is usually made up of a verb and 
some complement, and we know how are they supposed to be put together in order for them to 
make sense, to be meaningful.4 In other words, we make sense of a sentence, we understand a sentence, 
we know what it means based only on our knowledge of the meaning of its parts (our lexical 
knowledge) and how they are structured (our syntactic knowledge).  
 To sum it up, the Principle of Compositionality is at the core of any formal semantics, that 
is, of any attempt to provide a theory of meaning by means of formal models and methods. 
1.2. Monstrous Indexicals 
Now, in any starter set there are some very special blocks called indexicals. Indexicals are those 
expressions of a language whose meaning is dependent on context. Many different words in any 
natural language exhibit context-sensitivity, but there are a number of them that are particularly 
sensitive, so to speak. In the English language, this class of words includes expressions like ‘I’, ‘now’, 
‘it’ and ‘that’. Think, for example, of the word ‘this’. When uttering “this” one can sometimes point 
at an object to show what one is talking, though usually it is not required; most of the time we can 
infer what someone is designating when saying “this” based on a salient aspect of the context, as in 
the sentence “I knew I would have to talk about this at some point in my thesis” where “this” refers 
to the topic of indexicals. But can we ever know what does “this” refer to without knowing the 
context in which is used? Indexical words like ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘now’, ‘tomorrow’, 
‘yesterday’, etc, seem to be of a different kind from that of other words like ‘Eduardo’, ‘book’, 
‘believe’, ‘sun’, ‘philosophy’, ‘is’, etc. We can get to the meaning of these latter words without placing 
them in a specific context. However, the former class of words are characterised by a particular 
form of strong context-dependency. Following Russell, Szabó and Thomason (2019, p.166-1667) list 
 
4 We might, of course, do not even know who Pedrito, Juanito and Kaija are, but we still understand the sentence, we 
just do not know whom the sentence is about.  
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the following observations about them: (i) they don’t seem to be definable without appealing to 
other words of the same kind; (ii) they seem to lack any descriptive content (the word by itself does 
not tell us anything about what it refers or points to); (iii) although they seem to apply to many 
different objects, they are not really ambiguous, given a context, we know exactly what they are 
about; (iv) they appear to have a single, constant meaning (they do have rules that tell us how to 
use them), however, this meaning cannot be their designation (knowing their rules of use does not 
mean knowing what they designate); and finally (v), they are neither proper names nor descriptions 
(no one is named ‘I’ and ‘I’ does not really describe anything or anyone the way ‘the President of 
Estonia’, for example, does). Following Kaplan (1989, p. 401-491) one can further classify these 
words into two groups, pure indexicals and impure indexicals. Pure indexicals seem to be even more 
puzzling in that they do not require a physical demonstration or a pointing-at to convey their 
meaning, like impure indexicals, or demonstratives, do. In the case of pure indexicals one is 
supposed to infer their meaning by attention to the discourse, by means of the context in which 
they occur. The perfect example of indexicals are pronouns: ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘it’, ‘we’, the plural 
‘you’, ‘they’ and their many different word forms built from their basic lexemes. 
Luckily for us, semanticist found a way of tackling these mysterious words by construing 
mathematical models that, besides having the regular formal apparatus of first-order quantified 
logic, implement contextual parameters—such as an agent or speaker, a time, and a place, and so 
on—as additional inputs to the interpretation of a language (Ball & Rabern, 2018, p. 15).  
I will now introduce some simple notations in order to show how typed lambda calculus—a  
system that translate expressions of fragment of English—is used to make certain aspects of natural 
more perspicuous, i.e., to present sentences and expressions in a clearer, more defined way.  One 
can take, for instance, the peculiar word ‘I’. First, I will use the double cornered brackets ⟦.⟧ to 
indicate the denotation of an expression, adding in turn the superscripts a and w to indicate the 
parameters or points of reference of an agent and a world. One can then provide a definition of the 
personal pronoun ‘I’, which is the rule that says that ‘I’ refers to the agent at a context, like this:  
⟦‘I’⟧a,w = a  
Put simply, the denotation of ‘I’ is the agent or speaker of its context of utterance—the context in 
which the expression was said or, in this case, inscribed—represented by the ordered pair <a,w>.  
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Next, I will use ‘T’ to indicate the positive truth value (Truth) and ‘iff’ as an abbreviation of 
“if and only if” (a biconditional). The lambda symbol λ, or abstraction operator, is used as a 
variable binder that allows one to describe a variety of functions without having to name 
each one of them. A function, if one remembers some high school algebra, is a sort of 
pairing between objects or elements: it assigns to each element x of a set X, called “the 
domain of the function”, a single element y of another set Y (which can be the same as X), 
known as “the codomain of the function”. Such relation is denoted f (x)=y where f stands 
for the name of the function, x is the argument or input of the function, and y is the value 
of the function, or output. Here, the single cornered brackets [.] will then stand for the name of 
a function and the simple round brackets (.) for its argument, so that f (x)=y will be presented in 
the form [λx.x](x)=y. 
With this in mind, I can in turn give the truth conditions of a sentence like “I love sauna” using 
lambda calculus in the following manner:  
⟦‘I love sauna’⟧a,w = T iff (⟦‘love sauna’⟧a,w)( ⟦‘I’⟧a,w) = T 
          iff [λx.x loves sauna in w] (⟦‘I’⟧a,w) = T 
                    iff [λx.x loves sauna in w] (a) = T 
          iff a loves sauna in w5   
It looks, then, like the apparent mystery behind indexicals has been brought to light, but let us not 
hurry, there still might be something monstrous lurking in the darkness. 
1.3. The Character/Content Distinction 
In the seminal Demonstratives, Kaplan, who one might consider a shining champion in the realm of 
formal semantics, established the idea of meaning as having a two-folded aspect: character and content. 
Each of these aspects plays a certain role in his semantic theory. Roughly, what he calls ‘content’ is 
 
5 This example is somehow based on the one given by Ball & Rabern (2018, p. 16). 
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the information contained in an assertion in a particular context6, or “what is said”. One could think 
of content as the proposition expressed by an assertion of a sentence. It is at the level of content 
that, according to Kaplan, semantic composition occurs. On the other hand, a ‘character’ encodes 
the dependence of the content of an expression on the context of use. One could also think of 
character as a function from contexts to contents, where the domain is a set of sequences of content 
generating parameters. Similarly, one could think of content as a function from circumstances to 
extensions, where the domain is another set of parameters or indices, usually world-time pairs, 
called “circumstances of evaluation”. The following diagram might help one visualize Kaplan’s 
three-step process from the character of an expression to its extension or denotation:  
                                                        CIRCUMSTANCE: v 
 
CONTEXT: c                                                                                    EXTENSION: ⟦.⟧c,v                                                                                                           
 
                                                         CONTENT: ⟦.⟧c                                                  
CHARACTER: ⟦.⟧ 
Where the domain of a character function is a set C, and where each c ∊ C determines a tuple of 
content-generating parameters (the contexts of utterance). Meanwhile, the domain of a content 
function is a set V. Each v ∊ V is another tuple of parameters (the circumstances of evaluation).7  
According to Ball and Rabern (2019, p.396), Robert Stalnaker finds two independent—though 
often conflated—reasons for which Kaplan adopted this two-step procedure: first, there is “a 
linguistic motivation stemming from the compositional interaction of intensional operators and 
indexicals” (e.g., the interaction present in sentences like “in the future, everyone now living will be 
 
6 It is important to remark here that in Kaplan’s theory, the notion of utterance is not the same as that of 
sentence-in-a-context (1989, p. 546).  
7 Or as Ball and Rabern succinctly summarise: “Contexts play a content-generating role—resolving 
context-dependence in order to determine what’s said—and indices play a content-evaluating role—they’re 
the things of which what’s said is either true or false”(2019, p.396).  
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dead”, where the indexical expression ‘now’ does not shift in the scope of the intensional operator 
‘in the future’); on the other hand, there is “a pragmatic motivation stemming from the idea that a 
semantic theory should give an account of assertoric content8 and its broader role in 
communication”.9 However, some criticism has been brought against the two-step kaplanian 
approach:  
To make just one example: the sentence “I am a philosophy student” has as one of its semantic 
constituents an indexical, ‘I’, which turns the sentence into an expression whose character is not a 
constant function. This means that it may convey different contents depending on the context of 
utterance. When uttered by me, the sentence is true; it expresses the true proposition that I am a 
philosophy student. On the other hand, when the same sentence is uttered by my sister, who is an 
economics student, it comes out as false. Thus, we have two different contents for one and the 
same expression. This is so because Kaplan’s theory has at its core two basic principles regarding 
demonstratives and indexicals: 
Principle 1. The referent of a pure indexical depends on the context10, and the referent of a 
demonstrative depends on the associated demonstration.  
Principle 2. Indexicals, pure and demonstrative alike, are directly referential.  
 
8 Rabern defines ‘assertoric content’ in the following manner: “[r]oughly speaking, when someone makes an 
assertion by uttering a sentence φ, they offer up some information for their audience to consider. This 
information that is offered up is the content of the utterance, i.e. it is what is said by the act of uttering 
the sentence φ. Let’s call what is said by the utterance of a sentence the assertoric content of a sentence” 
(2012, p. 76).  
9 However, the two-step kaplanian approach has not been met without criticism. First, the linguistic 
motivation regarding the behaviour of indexicals with intensional operators seems to be uncalled for: to 
accommodate for the empirical facts—the same empirical facts that fuel Kaplan’s monster ban—one would 
only require a multiple indexing system; the sharp character/content distinction is not indispensable, as can 
be observed in a system like Lewis’ (Cf. Kamp 1971, Stalnaker 2017). Moreover, the identification made by 
Kaplan between the roles of semantic value and assertoric content (or what is said, in Kaplan’s terminology) has 
been criticised by Rabern in a number of papers (Cf. Rabern 2012, 2017, 2019) arguing that assertoric content 
violates the principle of compositionality and thus, the two notions must be distinguished. 
10 This is in line with what Schlenker (2003, p. 29) calls ‘the Fixity Thesis’: the referent of an indexical is fixed 
by the context and it is not affected by any logical operators. 
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Consequently, and in contrast to our first example, a sentence with a constant character, let us say, 
“Arvo Pärt is the author of Fratres”, is a sentence with no presence of indexicals11, and for that 
reason, it expresses the same content in all contexts. 
1.4. There Are No Monsters. 
Now, let me introduce some basic notation. ‘⟦ ϕ ⟧c,i’ will denote the extension the expression ϕ has 
relative to context c and circumstance i. The Character of ϕ, then, is the function  
λkλj [ϕ]k,j   
where k and j stand for a context variable and a circumstance variable, respectively. Consequently, 
the Content of ϕ in context c is the function 
  λj [ϕ]c,j 
While Kaplan is happy to allow intensional operators, that is, operators that act on content—like  
tense or modal operators—he does not appear to be that comfortable with operators that affect 
character (in fact, he is so uncomfortable with them that he calls them “monsters” (1989, p. 510)). 
The example he uses of a putative device like this is ‘in some contexts’, as it occurs in:  
(1)   In some contexts it is true that I am not a philosophy student.  
What the operator ‘In some contexts it is true’—which  I will formalise as Μ— putatively does is 
that it takes content-generating parameters as arguments the same way intensional operators are fed 
with content-evaluating parameters, thus having the following truth conditions: 
⟦ Μϕ ⟧c,i  = T iff  c⟦ ϕ ⟧c,i = T 
Now I can introduce the characterisation of a monstrous sentential operator as proposed by Rabern 
(2010, p. 395): 
 
11 Here and throughout this paper I set aside the question of whether verb tenses are indexicals.  
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Definition 2. A sentential operator Σ is a monster in L if and only if in the semantic 
evaluation of a sentence Σϕ, ϕ is evaluated with respect to a sequence of content generating 
parameters c’ that is different from the sequence of content generating parameters c with 
respect to which Σϕ is evaluated. 
In other words, a monster operator is such that it modifies the character of a sentence. Non-
monstrous operators do not mess with character; they affect, if anything, the content of an 
expression, and they do so directly, that is, without modifying the character of such expression. 
Take for instance, an operator like negation. In the sentence “Tallinn is not the capital of Estonia” 
the operator ‘not’ does not alter the character of its embedded expression: all the words in the 
sentence retain their usual meaning; all what the operator ‘not’ does is that it switches the truth-
conditions of the sentence, so that if “Tallinn is the capital of Estonia” is true (as it happens to be), 
its negation must be false, and hence, “Tallinn is not the capital of Estonia” is false.  On the other 
hand, it looks like the character of sentence (1), “In some contexts it is true that I am not a 
philosophy student.”, has been somehow affected: the ‘I’ in (1) must refer to me, for I myself wrote 
it, yet again, it looks like its reference has been blanked, so that its actual context of utterance cannot 
decisively settle who does it refer to.  
Real monsters, thus, have the power to rewrite contexts, and this might seem to happen with the 
operator ‘In some context it is true that’, for the sequence of content generating parameters of ϕ, 
as defined in the truth conditions of Μϕ, namely, ⟦ ϕ ⟧c,i , is different from that of ϕ evaluated on 
its own, namely, ⟦ ϕ ⟧c,i. 
With this in mind, one might try to use sentence (1) in such a way that its truth in any 
context would require there to be someone in some context, not in some circumstance, who is not a 
philosophy student at the time of the context, and of course there is a context (several, actually) 
where someone is not a philosophy student at the time of that context. But one would inevitably 
fail to use (1) in that way, for it is hard to see how one could make sense of it without interpreting 
the indexical I as referring to me, its author.  
Kaplan’s preoccupation is that even though we can very easily design such operators on the 
basis of his two-dimensional semantic approach, we should refrain from doing so because a 
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theoretical model that allows for monsters does not accurately represent how natural language 
works; instead, it obscures the original conceptual distinction between contexts of use and 
circumstances of evaluation, and deceives us to believe that there is a possible operator that works 
with each possible parameter. But for Kaplan this is nothing but a fairy-tale: in natural languages, 
linguistic operators work only on certain specific parameters and only at the level of content.  
Furthermore, it seems that what Kaplan is arguing is not only that there are no monsters in 
English12, but that there could not be any monsters at all (p. 510). The reason for this is that not 
only would monsters violate his Principle 2—the  intuitive idea that indexicals are directly 
referential—but they would also transgress the Principle of Compositionality, which, as 
previously explained, tells us that the semantic value of a complex expression is determined by the 
semantic value of its parts and the way there are syntactically combined. 
The disastrous consequences of this indexical shifting can be shown if we look back at our 
prior example: 
(2) a. I am not a philosophy student. 
        b. Eduardo is not a philosophy student. 
These two sentences have a different character. Nevertheless, in the same context—this context—
they share the same content, that is, express the same false proposition that I am not a philosophy 
student. This is because the semantic value of the constituents of (2a) is the same as those of the 
constituents of (2b), and as a result of the principle of compositionality, the semantic value of both 
sentences is the same.  
Now, for the sake of the argument, suppose that ‘in some contexts…’ is an authentic monster and 
has the semantics described above, and consider the following sentences: 
(3)  a. In some contexts it is true that I am not a philosophy student.  
 
12 The most plausible interpretation would be to understand his claim about the absence of monsters as 
pertaining not only to the English language but to natural languages in general; otherwise he would have to 
explain what is so particular about the English language that his general theory, and in particular, his “two 
obvious principles” (1989, p. 492), only apply to this specific language. 
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b. In some contexts it is true that Eduardo is not a philosophy student.  
Again, they would be distinct in character, but also in content, since (3a) would expresses a true 
proposition while (3b) would not.13 This is so because whereas sentences (2a) and (2b) have the 
same referent as its subject, the referent of (3b), Eduardo, might not be the same of (3a) even when 
I am the author of both sentences. Consequently, we can now see how would “monsters destroy 
the compositionality of content” (Westerstahl, 2012, p. 213), for the monstrous presence of “in 
some contexts” makes “I” and “Eduardo” fail to be coextensional, even though by its context of 
utterance they must be so. Compositionality is now broken, for to know what (3a) means we cannot 
solely rely on our knowledge of what its constituent words mean and how they are put together. 
Ultimately, a monster is dangerous (too dangerous for Kaplan) because it shifts the contribution 
that an expression makes to the content of the more complex expression to which it is embedded.14 
No wonder why Kaplan would like to keep the monsters off, then, for it seems that if one 
were to let them in one would have to do without the compositionality of content. But if monsters 
are not real, what are then operators like ‘in some contexts it is true that’? Well, Kaplan would argue 
that although (2a) and (2b) are expressions of a natural language, the most plausible interpretation 
of (3a) and (3b) would require us to rephrase them and to make sense of them as introducing a 
metalinguistic predicate, like in the following reading: 
(4)  a. In some contexts “I am not a philosophy student” is true.  
b. In some contexts “Eduardo is not a philosophy student” is true.  
 
13 Of course one could argue that (3b) is also true, since evidently there have been contexts in which it has 
been true, and there will be contexts in which it will be true, but for the sake of the argument, let us reduce 
the range of times to include only present contexts.  
14 For a detailed discussion on how monsters could (or can) affect certain semantic models like Kaplan’s but 
also Lewis’ see Ball & Rabern 2019. To briefly summarise their view: “so construed, the debate about 
monsters is not just a dry, technical matter, but reflects deep disagreements about the fundamental structure 
of a semantic theory [and so we argue that:] 1. The interesting notion of a monster is not an operator that 
shifts some formal parameter, but rather an operator that shifts parameters that play a certain theoretical 
role [just like the monster explored here shifts parameters that have to do directly with the role of reference 
and content contribution]. 2. One cannot determine whether a given semantic theory allows monsters simply 
by looking at the formalism […] [the existence of monsters then, from the point of view of a semantic 
theory, depends on whether such a theory allows for them or not].3. The proposal—to shift only the “index” 
parameter, and to forbid shifting the “context” parameter—is therefore perfectly compatible with the 
existence of monsters (in the interesting sense)” (p. 395).  
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As Emar Maier succinctly explains:  
[F]or Kaplan, direct discourse is just a species of pure quotation, i.e. the quotation marks mark the 
use/mention distinction an the I inside the quote does not refer at all, so, a fortiori, it’s reference is 
not shifted by a monstrous operator (2016, p. 370). 
Hence, one can see that these are not monsters but, at best, furtive quotation devices.  
1.5.  A World of Monsters  
Nevertheless, there have been a number of responses to Kaplan’s claim that there are no monsters 
in English or in any other natural language, for that matter. The purported empirical evidence points 
to the presence of character operators across a variety of languages around the world, and even to 
some more insidious monsters within the English language itself.  
First, Israel and Perry (1996), working on the semantics of discourse and speech reports, 
signaled the possibility of modal and epistemic monsters, a claim that was later supported by Predelli 
(2008) and Santorio (2010). Schlenker (2003) then pointed to monstrous behaviour related to 
propositional attitude clauses in Amharic language. Similar monsters have supposedly been found 
in other natural languages like Zazaki and Slave, as presented by Anand and Nevins (2004), and 
modern Uyghur, according to Shklovsky and Sudo (2014). Finally, Recanati (2001), Maier (2007), 
and Jaszczolt and Huang (2017) have also discussed monsters disguised as quotations, and it even 
seems that Rabern (2010)—if  one follows a  basic Tarskian semantics—found monsters hidden in 
Kaplan’s own Demonstratives in the shape of quantifiers and variable-binders in general, something 
that was also pointed out by Yli-Vakkuri (2013). Other areas of philosophical semantics, like two-
dimensional modal logics (e.g., Davies and Humberstone 1980) or the problem of substitution in 
opaque contexts (e.g., Recanati 2001), have also been given a monstrous treatment.  
It looks as if, then, monsters have just been hiding in plain sight, and, unless this is all but 





2. Of Monsters and Children  
In this section I will offer a superficial characterization of a case that appears to be a clear 
counterexample to Kaplan’s statement that there are no monster operators in natural languages and, 
more specifically, to his assertion that they could not be added to English. 
2.1. The Living Art of Albur 
To begin with, there is an interesting phenomenon in Mexico known as albur. Albur is a 
colloquial idiomatic practice that is generally considered to be an endemic expression of Mexican 
idiosyncratic misogyny, or “macho culture”, and that can be characterised as a sort of verbal duel or 
dispute where the contestants display their mental agility and dominion of their language by 
throwing at each other flashy and clever remarks tainted by their violent sexual connotations. It is 
a competition of double entendre, of veiled and not-so-veiled insults where the winner 
metaphorically penetrates the defeated with his speech by means of a variety of rhetoric, syntactic 
and semantic alterations. As Octavio Paz puts it:  
This ambiguous conception is made very clear in the word games or battles -- full of obscene 
allusions and double meanings - that are so popular in Mexico City. Each of the speakers tries to 
humiliate his adversary with verbal traps and ingenious linguistic combinations, and the loser is the 
person who cannot think of a comeback, who has to swallow his opponent's jibes. These jibes are 
full of aggressive sexual allusions; the loser is possessed, is violated, by the winner, and the spectators 
laugh and sneer at him (1985, p. 39).  
Therefore, to be a skilled alburero is “to turn [words] upside down, modify their meaning15, twist 
their intension, make them anew, blow them up so that his interlocutors swallow all their replies 
and comebacks up” (Mejía Prieto, 1993, p. 11).16  
2.2.  Monster in a Shery Bottle  
Our monster, hence, emerges nourished by these somehow perverted semantic conditions, 
though in a much more innocent social environment. The story begins thus: in Mexican Spanish 
 
15 The word ‘meaning’ here is used in a non-technical way. 
16 The translation is mine. 
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there is a traditional refrán (popular saying) that goes like “Botellita de jerez, todo lo que digas será al revés17” 
[Little sherry bottle, everything you say will be the other way around]. This proverb is commonly 
used among children—and occasionally by adults—as a response that deflects insults, jibes, and 
taunts, back to the name-caller, like a mirror-shield.18 This guileless locution was corrupted by the 
irreverent influence of albur culture and was turned into a children’s language-game which involves 
the use and mastery of a character operator. The game goes this way: imagine two children, one a 
bit older or meaner than the other. The older one tries to mock the younger one by twisting the 
meaning19 of her sentences. The rules are as follows: first, by uttering the particle ‘Botellita de jerez’ 
[Little sherry bottle], the speaker alters the character of the sentence embedded under it. What this 
“invocation” does is that it exchanges the referents of the indexicals ‘you’ and ‘I’, so that whenever 
one of them is used within the scope of ‘Little sherry bottle’, their meanings are switched: ‘you’ 
refers to the speaker, whereas ‘I’ refers to the addressee.20 Second, the sherry bottle phrase does not 
affect any other word, only the 1st and 2nd singular personal pronouns, be them in a subject pronoun, 
direct or indirect object pronoun, or prepositional pronoun position. Third, it only works with 
complete sentences, individual words or incomplete sentences would not do. Fourth, if the operand 
clause embedded to ‘Little sherry bottle’ does not contain any of the first two personal pronouns, 
then its character remains unaltered. Fifth and last, the contestant who loses the game is the one 
who, after an indefinitely long exchange of covert jeers, either fails to correctly interpret the content 
of his rival’s remarks or himself delivers a poorly concealed insult. Shortly, to lose the battle is to 
lose track of the Sherry Bottle monster and its powers of distortion.  
 
17 (Mejía Prieto, 1993, p. 11). There are some regional variations of this expression in across different parts 
of Mexico, but they all convey the same idea of a veer or a swerve, a change of direction. For instance: 
“Botellita de jerez, quien lo dice es quien lo es”, which could be translated as “Little sherry bottle, the one 
who says that is the one who is that” 
18 Analogous expressions in other languages and cultures include the American English voice “I am rubber 
and you are glue, everything you say bounces off of me and sticks to you” and the Russian phrases “Говоришь 
про меня переводишь на себя” [You are speaking about me but it redirects onto yourself] and “Кто как 
обзывается, тот так и называется” [Whatever name you call someone is what you yourself are called], see 
Berdy (2009).  
19 Again, ‘meaning’ here is not theory laden.  
20 The possibility of a monster very much like this one is discussed in Rabern 2019. Though it could be taken 
as a response to Rabern, this paper was originally a short essay written in April 2019 for Professor Juhani 
Yli-Vakkuri’s course on the Philosophy of Language at the University of Tartu. 
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With this in mind, let me introduce some examples of friendly insults21 one could come up 
with in this game. First, a sentence without the Botellita clause, and then the same sentence 
embedded under the Botellita matrix: 
(5) a.  [Yo]22estoy               bien      menso. 
  be.PRES.SUBJ.1SG   very    dumb. 
  ‘I am very dumb’. 
 
 b. Botellita de jerez                          [   [yo] estoy                      bien     menso  ]. 
  Little sherry bottle.MONSTER     [be.PRES.SUBJ.2SG    very    dumb]. 
  Little sherry bottle, I/you* am/are* very stupid. 
  ‘You are very dumb.’ 
 
And this is what happens when we have both the first and second pronouns: 
(6) a.  [Yo] te amo                  [a ti]. 
  love.PRES.SUBJ.1SG      2SG.OBJ 
  ‘I love you.’ 
 
 b. Botellita de jerez                          [ [yo] te amo                        [a ti] ]. 
  Little sherry bottle.MONSTER   [love.PRES.SUBJ.2SG.       1SG.OBJ]. 
  Little sherry bottle, I/you* love you/me*. 
 
21 As Anania and Cózar Angulo write: “The intention of an albur is to verbally trip the other person jokingly 
and in fun. [It is] a means to communicate an insult or an affront that is generally friendly towards another 
interlocutor” (2014, p. 144). It is worth noting how the Botellita de Jerez refrán, itself is a non-aggressive 
response to insults, has been subverted into a device to perform or create new insults, no matter how veiled 
or beautifully wrapped they are. For this reason, this game strikes one as a form of training for, or first 
contact with—the mature, non-suitable for children—albur.   
22 Since conjugated verb endings in Spanish grammar already indicate both person and number, subject 
pronouns can be left out of the sentence. I will, however, mark them inside brackets for a clearer exposition.  
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  ‘You love me.’ 
 
One could also capture the truth conditions of the Little Sherry Bottle Operator –which, for 
simplicity, one could call the “Twist Operator”– by making use of a model that reconceives 
contexts as triplets made up of: w, the world of  context k; s, the speaker at  context k (the one who 
says ϕ); and a, the addressee at context k (the one to whom ϕ is uttered to).23 The truth condition 
of Twist would thus be the following: 
⟦ Twist ϕ ⟧ <wk,sk,ak>j = ⟦ ϕ ⟧ <wk,ak,sk>j 
Next, suppose that our older kid, Pedrito, understands very well how Little Sherry Bottle goes, 
but possibly his younger friend, Juanito, does not. Taking advantage of this situation, Pedrito utters 
the following sentence: 
(7) a. Botellita de jerez: estoy bien menso.  
‘Twist: I am very dumb.’ 
Formalised as: 
(7) b.  ⟦ ‘Twist: I am very dumb’⟧<wc,sc,ac>,i 
Juanito, poor little kid, failing to understand how a monster works, thinks that Pedrito is calling 
himself an idiot when in fact the content of (7a) in context c is the same as that of the following 
sentence if expressed in that same context: 
(8) a. [Tú] estás bien menso. 
‘You are very dumb.’ 
Because the Twist Operator switches the s, the author, for the a, the addressee, in <wc,sc,ac>,i giving 
in return: 
 
23 It is worth noting that the parameter of the addressee is missing in Kaplan’s original framework since he 
did not deal with the second person pronoun.  
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⟦ ‘You are dumb’ ⟧<wc,ac,sc>i 
That is why the “I” in (7b) is referring no longer to Pedrito, the speaker, but to Juanito, the hearer. 
And that is how cunning little Pedrito has managed to sneakily insult Juanito. Something similar 
would happen with the following examples:  
(9) a. ⟦ ‘Twist: I love you’ ⟧ <w,s,a>,i  = ⟦ ‘You love me’ ⟧ <w,a,s>,i  24 
b. ⟦ ‘Twist: meeting you was the best thing that ever happened to me!’ ⟧ <w,s,a>,i  =     
⟦ ‘Meeting me was the best thing that ever happened to you!’ ⟧<w,a,s>,i  
Also note that 
c. ⟦ ‘Twist: twist: ϕ’⟧ <w,a,s>,i = |‘ϕ’|<w,a,s>,i 
Accordingly, here is a sketchy argument in favour of the Twist Operator being monstrous: 
Following Kaplan’s notation I will represent a sentence’s character by ‘{}c’, where c stands for 
context, or in this case, the <w,a,s> triplet I introduced previously but without the subscripts 
indicating context. Now, let s = Eduardo, a = you, @ = the actual world, and suppose that I am 
not happy, but you, my addressee, are. Then, 
(10) a. ⟦ ‘Twist: I am happy’⟧<@,s,a>,@  
≠  
b. ⟦ ‘Twist: Eduardo is happy’⟧<@,s,a>,@  
 
24 As helpfully pointed out by Indrek Lõbus and Patrick Shirreff, when confronted with examples like this 
one, we might be tempted to consider the effects of ‘Little Sherry Bottle’ not as altering the context-
parameters of an expression, i.e., working at a semantic level, but rather working at a metasemantic level, or 
in this case, a syntactic one. There is a concise reply to this consideration: a syntactic account that tries to 
explain the Little Sherry Bottle cases would have to be involve some sort of iterative rule, and since a syntactic 
account—if there would be one—would have to do with any possible syntax, we would need to also have 
an infinite number of syntactic types where each one has its own replacement rule (say, for example, replace 
‘I’ for ‘you’). Even if we come up with an account that offers all this and satisfactorily explains what the 
Little Sherry Bottle expression is doing in terms of syntax, the more simple monstrous account would still 
be more preferable, precisely because of its simplicity.  
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Since the truth values of (10a) and (10b) are different, the former being true while the latter being 
false. Consequently,  
(10) c. {‘Twist: I am happy’}<@,s,a> ≠ {‘Twist: Eduardo is happy’}<@,s,a>  
Because the content contribution of ‘I’ in (10a) and the contribution of ‘Eduardo’ in (10b) are 
different, yet  
(10) d. {‘I am happy’}<@,s,a> = {‘Eduardo is happy’}<@,s,a>    
Therefore, we see how the Twist Operator violates the compositionality of meaning just like a 
monster would. For this reason, it looks like our boys are using a very elegant monster to subtly 
make fun of each other. Why do they do this? Because Mexican kids are savage. Savage enough as 
to even prove Kaplan wrong.  
  
3. Monster Trials 
The main goal of this section is to offer responses to four prima facie objections that could be raised 
against the claim that this operator is in fact a monster, that is, that the semantic nature of the phrase 
‘Little sherry bottle’ or, on the same grounds, of the expression Twist’, which I have used to simplify 
the former expression, is that of an operator that meddles with linguistic character. These objections 
have been used in the past to explain away putative monsters, that is, to show that the cases of 
apparent monsters that have appeared before are simply that: putative, not real monsters. The first 
objection originates in Kaplan’s claim that monsters are actually quotation devises. The second one 
pretends to exorcise a monster into a harmless implicature trigger, rendering the discussion into 
just a matter of innocent pragmatics. A third asks if this could simply be a case of semantic 
stipulation, as some famous riddled horses have been shown to be. Finally, the last one wonders if 
what these children are doing is natural, that is, if the linguistic behaviour engaged in the Sherry 





3.1.  “Monsters”? 
In his 2016 paper “A Plea Against Monsters”, Emar Maier points to “four types of potential 
monsters and reconstruct[s] Kaplan’s reasons for dismissing them” (p. 368). Each of these types 
involves a certain phenomenon: 1) Quantifying over contexts, 2) Pure Quotation, 3) Direct 
Discourse and 4) Indirect Discourse. The first three types can be “explained away as involving 
mention”, while the last one can be analysed as dealing with an intensional operator.  
I will briefly show why these strategies will not work with the Sherry Bottle monster. To 
begin with, as illustrated in the example bellow, Twist allows for quantifying and it is not case of 
direct discourse (and hence, neither a case of pure quotation): 
(11) a. Todos piensan que botellita de jerez: yo soy un tonto. 
Everyone1 thinks that little sherry bottle I1 am a fool.  
Meaning 
 Everyone thinks that you are a fool.   
If we tried to do a Kaplanian manoeuvre of direct discourse and assumed the sherry bottle operator 
in (11a) simply adds invisible quotation marks,25we would find ourselves unable to make the 
quantifier break into the embedded sentence “I am a fool”, thus ending up with a reading of (11a) 
that says that everyone thinks everyone (each one of them) is a fool, which is not what we were 
trying to say. 
Further, Maier’s own attempt a dealing with monsters involving indirect quotation possess 
no threat to our monster: in his paper “Quotation Marks as Monsters or the Other Way Around?”, 
he argues that indexical shifting like the one observed in monstrous clauses—particularly the 
behaviour of the indexical I in Amharic language—should be analysed as a case of mixed quotation 
using a hybrid use-mention logic (p. 148-149). For matters of scope and extension I will not present 
the formal apparatus he uses to analyse the Amharic I—which, though most likely functional and 
successful, seems to be way more complex and laborious than a monstrous approach—but I will 
 
25 Cf. (4a-b) in § 1. 4 
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simply refer to his account of what indexical shifting consists of. According to Maier, then,  a shifty 
I in the Amharic language is in fact a quoted I that “refers to the individual the reported speaker intended 
to refer to with her use of I”(p. 149).26 Such intentions would be, in turn, available in the common 
ground of the report situation (p.150). He claims too, that this metasemantic approach has a further 
advantage over the semantic one (the monstrous one) in that such a recourse to intention offers a 
less rigid account, one that doesn’t bind the I to the reported speaker invariably. Consequently, one 
could expect the claim that our monster is of this very same kind. I will dismiss such an accusation, 
nonetheless, on the basis that Maier himself maintains that the sort of indexical shift he is proposing 
to analyse as quotation is that which is exclusive to reportative contexts due to the “inherently 
reportative nature of quotation.” Twist is not a monster of reportative contexts. The monstrous 
effects of Twist are not enclosed by a reportative context. In this sense, Little Sherry Bottle is a very 
particular monster, since, in contrast to the majority of character operators discussed in the 
literature27, this naughty little creature is not an operator linked to propositional attitude verbs. The 
Twist monster manifests itself without needing a propositional attitude verb28 nor a speech report 
to summon it. In effect, it could also haunt an attitude report. To illustrate, consider the following 
reports, the first one as direct, the second as indirect discourse:  
(11) b. Juanito dijo: “Botellita de jerez: estoy bien menso.”  
Juanito said: “Little sherry bottle: I am very dumb.” 
c. Juanito dijo que *botellita de jerez*29 tú estás bien menso. 
Juanito said that *little sherry bottle* you are very dumb. 
We can see that Twist can be reported in direct discourse, that is, with its embedded sentence 
enclosed by quotation mark and also in indirect discourse, embedded as a that-clause. Moreover, it 
 
26 Emphasis in the original text.  
27 Cf. Schlenker (2003), Anand and Nevins (2004), or Shklovsky and Sudo (2014) for monsters of reportative 
contexts and Israel and Perry (1996), Predelli (2008) and Santorio (2010) for epistemic and modal monsters 
which, although not exclusive to reportative contexts, still arise only in the presence of propositional attitude 
verbs.  
28 Prior examples (5b) and (7a) in § 2.2 should make this clear.  
29 This construction sounds odd but there is no reason to believe that it is eo ipso infelicitous.  
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seems that Twist can also be expressed within the scope of epistemic verbs, as shown in the 
following examples: 
(11) d. “Yo creo que botellita de jerez [yo] estoy bien menso.” 
I believe that little sherry bottle I am very stupid. 
e. “Yo sé que botellita de jerez [yo] estoy bien menso.” 
I know that little sherry bottle I am very stupid. 
Similarly, with volitives like ‘want’ or ‘desire’, like in the following sentence: 
(11) f. “Yo quiero que botellita de jerez yo te quiera (a ti).”30 
I want that little sherry bottle I loved you. 
Therefore, it seems that, first, twist is neither a quotation nor a mixed quotation device, and 
secondly, the indexical shift effected by it is different from that observed in other monstrous 
constructions in that it is not exclusive to reportative contexts.  
3.2. Cancelling Monsters 
Another objection would be to claim that Little Sherry Bottle is not a monster but something like 
a pragmatic trigger, in the manner of an implication or a presupposition. Such strategy has been 
used not to explain monsters away but to place them outside the field of semantics31, which would 
eo ipso end the discussion, for what we are trying to argue here is the existence of semantic monsters, 
that is, linguistic phenomena that are determined by generally accepted convention. To put it in a 
sketchy yet intuitive way: it has to do with how the linguistic items work on their own.  
Now, when it comes to pragmatic triggers, cancellability is a basic test. If our operator were 
not a semantic monster but rather another sort of pragmatic creature, one could face it up and 
cancel it. But real monsters are not that easy to get rid of, for one cannot just cancel them. Grice 
explains how we can cancel implicatures in the following way:  
 
30 This sentence seems infelicitous. A more natural construction would be “(Yo) quiero quererte (a ti)”, as in 
English “I want to love you”. Alternatively, the opposite construction with the subject and object of the 
sentence exchanged thus “(Yo) quiero que (tú) me quieras” is felicitous. 
31 Cf. Maier 2016, p. 373.  
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[A] putative conversational implicature that p is explicitly cancellable if, to the form of words the 
utterance of which putatively implicates that p, it is admissible to add but not p, or I do not mean to 
imply that p, and it is contextually cancellable if one can find situations in which the utterance of the 
form of words would simply not carry the implicature. (1975, p. 44)  
In order to show you the Mexican monster cannot be cancelled, consider the following sentence:  
(12) “Twist: you are the best thing that ever happened to me. However, I am not saying 
that I am the best thing that ever happened to you”. 
Next, suppose Pedrito utters a complex sentence with the exact same content of (12) to Juanito. 
Notice that only the first sentence is in the scope of the Twist Operator. One would expect Juanito, 
clever boy, to reply with something in the following manner:  
(13) “Yes, you are saying that you are the best thing that ever happened to me, you 
scoundrel!” 
For one can see how an utterance of (12) would be infelicitous, or in any case, dishonest. Just 
another attempt by Pedrito to cynically mock and outsmart Juanito. Furthermore, one can confirm 
that Twist is not an implicature trigger, since, unlike an implicature (and more like Roman Polanski) 
it just cannot be cancelled. 
3.3. Semantic Stipulation and Meaning Shifters. 
Another objection stands against our monster: what if the Sherry Bottle monster is not a character 
operator but rather an expression that invites to change the meanings of words, in this case, 
switching the meanings of ‘I’ and ‘you’? This would automatically disqualify Twist as a monster by 
categorising it as a hyperintensional operator. As Brian Rabern puts it: 
The notion of a “character operator” here is clearly of one that is sensitive to character and looks at 
its profile across various contexts—on analogy with a content operator that takes the intension of 
its complement and looks at its profile across circumstances—not an operation that reassigns the 
complement a different character (2019, p. 18).  
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While some authors have previously stated the connection between monsters and semantic 
stipulation (e.g., Israel an Perry 1996), Rabern is clear in denying that cases like the riddle “If we 
call a horse’s legs a tail, how many legs does a horse have?” constitute an example of a monster. If 
anything, riddles of this form are just examples of explicit meaning shift that “involve constructions 
of semantic stipulation, where one coins new terms or stipulates new meanings for old terms (p. 
19).” Now, natural languages seem to have plenty of resources for introducing new terms, and for 
changing the meaning of the old ones. These are cases of semantic stipulation and are not 
uncommon at all in everyday conversations. Take the following example: a young Finnish girl 
named ‘Kaija’ has just recently moved to Pedrito and Juanito’s neighbourhood and she starts 
hanging out with these two bad boys (she speaks Spanish too; her mom is also Mexican). They like 
playing football and learning about Finland, however, they struggle a lot to pronounce her name, 
so, they decide to call her ‘Lupita’. Thus, these kids have introduced a new name to refer to Kaija 
by mere and simple semantic stipulation: “From now on, we will call you ‘Lupita’”.  
It is not hard to see why Twist is not a case of renaming like the one mentioned above: to 
begin with, indexicals, though referential terms, are not proper names, first and foremost, because 
indexicals are context-sensitive expressions whereas names are not. Second, it is not as if Twist 
would just substitute the word ‘I’ for the word ‘you’. Twist is a swapping monster: it exchanges the 
referent of ‘I’ for that of ‘you’ and vice versa. The terms ‘Kaija’ and ‘Lupita’ have the same referent: 
Kaija. Third, again, being a switching of indexicals, it is different from the switching of singular 
names in that the relation between a singular name and its referent is taken to be mediated by a 
causal chain, while the way to get from ‘I’ to its referent is by applying the descriptive rule: identify 
the speaker of the context (Rabern 2019, p.2), as from ‘you’ to its respective referent is by following the 
rule that tells you to find the addressee of the context. In the case of general terms, like in the riddle “If 
you call a horse’s tail a leg, how many legs does a horse have?”, when we change the meaning of 
‘leg’ for that of ‘tail’, we are changing the definition of the word ‘leg’ for that of the word ‘tail’, or 
in formal semantics terms, we change the model by giving it a new interpretation function, one that 
maps the semantic value of the term ‘tail’ to the term ‘leg’. However, Twist does not modify the 




On the whole, the Little Sherry Bottle Operator is patently context-sensitive, a strong reason 
to believe it is not a meaning-shifter but an indexical-shifter. Moreover, following the Twist can be 
correctly characterised following any of the four notions of a monster that are offered by Rabern 
(2019, p.10):  
Characterological operator: For it operates on the character of its operand. 
Context-shifting operator: Since it shifts the Speaker and Addressee parameters of the 
context. 
Indexical-shifting operator: Because it shifts the referents of indexicals in its scope.  
Content-shifting operator: Given that it shifts indexicals, which are content-fixing 
parameters.   
Thus, it looks that according to Rabern we have found ourselves a real monster, an operator whose 
existence was once denied by Kaplan and it is now proclaimed by mischievous children. 
3.4. Unnatural Creations. 
There is one last underlaying and pervasive objection that is at once simple but quite possibly 
disastrous: what if what Juanito and Pedrito are doing cannot be considered a natural linguistic 
practice? What if the Little Sherry Bottle game, though created by simple-minded children, is in fact 
an artificial construct and thus—to  evoke Kaplan’s original description—the Twist Operator is, at 
the end of the day, a monster begat by elegance, not by nature?  
To elaborate on the last claim, I will now paraphrase an example put forward by Szabó and 
Thomason (2019, p.61-62) arguing that compositionality should be understood as a law of possible 
human languages. Imagine our dear children, Juanito and Pedrito, come up with yet another 
ingenious game which has the following rules: whenever the kids are in the presence of Lupita—
formerly known as Kaija—an utterance of the sentence (S)“Las saladitas son horneadas”, which could 
be translated as “Crackers are baked”, would lose its original and conventional meaning and instead 
it would mean that it is time for them to go home. If the same sentence (S) is uttered whenever 
Lupita is not around, it shall retain its usual meaning that crackers are baked. And that is all, the 
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children have come up with a new language, let us call it Baked Spanish, which is just like Spanish 
except for the sentence (S), whose meaning depends on whether Lupita is in the context of 
utterance or not. The meanings of article ‘las’, the noun ‘saladitas’, the verb ‘son’ and the adjective 
‘horneadas’, as well as the structure of the complete sentence ‘Las saladitas son horneadas’ is the same 
in Spanish and in Baked Spanish. Therefore, Baked English cannot be compositional, for the 
meaning of (S) is determined by its context of utterance and not solely by its syntactical structure 
and the lexical meaning of its constituents.  
The example above is supposed to show that noncompositional languages are fairly easy to 
imagine and even rather easy to learn. And this is in turn used to argue that one can imagine a 
compositional language going through changes that would render it noncompositional, in the same 
way that compositional English became the noncompositional Baked English after a few 
stipulations.  
So, even if compositionality is a law, it is certainly not a law of all possible languages. At best, it might 
be a law of all possible human languages—the sort of languages that normal human beings can acquire 
under normal social conditions as first languages. [Baked] English is plausibly not a possible human 
language in this sense: while it can be learned, competence with it is parasitic on prior competence with 
English (Szabó & Thomason, 2019, p.62). 
Well, it is also pretty easy to see how this example could be reformulated on the basis of the Little 
Sherry Bottle game and, hence, the same could be said about our Twist Language: that it is not a 
possible human language. But this would amount to say that what the children speak when they play 
Little Sherry Bottle is not a natural language, yet, if this is correct, then my entire argument never 
really leaves the ground: Kaplan’s ban has jurisdiction only within the realm of natural language, so, 
if I have been talking all along about an artificial language, he has always been right.  
Let us figure out whether this argument applies to our game too. First, take the sentence (S) 
and substitute it for a sentence (B) “Botellita de Jerez ϕ”, where ϕ is a variable for another sentence. 
Secondly, introduce the first four of the five rules I first mentioned in § 2.1, namely: 1) by uttering 
the particle ‘Botellita de jerez’, the speaker alters the character of the sentence embedded under it by 
exchanging the referents of the indexicals ‘you’ and ‘I’, so that ‘you’ refers to the speaker, whereas 
‘I’ refers to the addressee; 2) the sherry bottle phrase does not affect any other word, only the 1st 
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and 2nd singular personal pronouns; 3) it only works with complete sentences; 4) and final, if the 
operand clause embedded to ‘Little sherry bottle’ does not contain any of the first two personal 
pronouns, it retains its usual meaning. And so, it is alive! It is alive! The Mexican boys have created 
Bottle Spanish, a new artificial language!  
But have they really? I am going to show you how Botellita Spanish differs from a so-called 
artificial language like Baked Spanish. Just to start with, a sentence (B) differs from the sentence (S) 
in that when (S) is uttered in front of Lupita, all of its constituents—'las’, ‘saladitas’, ‘son’ and 
‘horneadas’—lose their regular meaning and thus the content of such an utterance becomes ‘Es hora 
de ir a casa’ , which is both lexically and syntactically different from the content of (S) uttered in the 
absence of Lupita. Nonetheless, an utterance of (B) would constantly retain its lexical and syntactical 
form if only for the changes in reference, it doesn’t erase the meaning of the other constituents of 
the expression, as it doesn’t eliminate meaningful constituents32 nor adds new ones. The following 
section should help clarify this point: 
Take two utterances of (S), (S⌐L), said when Lupita was not there, and (SL), uttered next to Lupita. 
Then,  
(S⌐L) ⟦‘Las saladitas son horneadas’ ⟧ 
c,i    = T iff  c [ ( c ≠ c ) ∧ ⟦‘Las saladitas son horneadas’ ⟧c,i  ]= T 
Where c stands for a context with Lupita. 
But this is what happens to the second utterance: 
(SL) ⟦‘Las saladitas son horneadas’ ⟧ 
c,i    = T iff  c ⟦ ‘Es hora de ir a casa’⟧ c,i  = T 
Where ⟦‘Las saladitas son horneadas’ ⟧c,i    is clearly distinct from ⟦‘Es hora de ir a casa’ ⟧c,i  in that the 
former has four meaningful constituents arranged in a particular syntactic structure, whereas the 
latter has no trace of any of the original constituents and instead introduces six new constituents 
arranged in a new structure.  
 
32 Cf. Szabó & Thomason 2019, p. 45.  
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Now, remember the truth conditions for our Twist Operator: 
⟦Twist ϕ⟧ <wk,sk,ak>j = T iff  ⟦ ϕ ⟧ <wk,ak,sk>j = T 
And apply them to an utterance of (B): 
⟦Botellita de Jerez ϕ⟧ <wk,sk,ak>j = T iff  ⟦ ϕ ⟧ <wk,ak,sk>j = T 
Where k stands for a context and j for a circumstance of evaluation and where we can substitute ϕ 
for the Spanish sentence ‘Te amo’ and imagine it is uttered by Juanito to Pedrito in front of Lupita.  
⟦Botellita de Jerez ‘te amo’⟧ <wc,sc,ac>i = T iff  ⟦‘te amo’⟧ <wc,ac,sc>i = T 
But in this case, ⟦Botellita de Jerez ‘te amo’⟧ <wc,sc,ac>i is only different from ⟦‘te amo’⟧ <wc,ac,sc>i  in that the 
parameters of their contexts are ordered differently and the expression Botellita de Jerez in the former, 
acting just like an operator would, disappears from the latter ⟦‘te amo’⟧ <wc,ac,sc>since it does not occur 
as a meaningful constituent, nevertheless, it contributes to the meaning of the phrases in which it 
occurs, like, for example, a negation operator does in the following formula: 
⟦⌐‘te amo’⟧ c, i = T iff  ⟦ ‘te amo’⟧c, i = F 
Thus, one can see how Botellita Spanish is not like Baked Spanish.  
Furthermore, one can notice another important difference: Baked Spanish and the Little Sherry 
Bottle game violate the principle of compositionality in different ways. Baked Spanish violates 
compositionality because in order to know the meaning of an expression in that language, in this 
case, the sentence (S), a speaker would have to consider external factors to those of syntactic 
structure and lexical meaning, that is, to figure the meaning of (S), a speaker would have to know 
not only the facts about what do the words mean and how are they structured in (S), but also 
whether Lupita is there or not. This further knowledge regarding the presence of Lupita makes 
Baked English noncompositional, for to understand the meaning of an expression of a 
compositional language one would only need to resort to one’s syntactic and lexical knowledge. On 
the other hand, our little game breaks compositionality in a different manner. It does so by incurring 
into a violation of the following principle: 
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 Substitutivity: Substituting within a complex expression an ultimate constituent for a 
synonymous one does not change the meaning of the complex expression.33 
And we can show this is so by going back to the argument provided at the end of § 2.1., p.16, where 
it was shown that {‘Twist: I am happy’}<@,s,a> and {‘Twist: Eduardo is happy’}<@,s,a> are two 
distinct characters that when provided with a particular context—this context—fail to arrive to the 
same content even though by the principle of substitutivity they should, since in this context, both 
the constituents ‘I’ and ‘Eduardo’ refer to the same entity: me. 34 
 Notwithstanding, in contradistinction to Baked English, one can understand the meaning, 
or at least, the truth-conditions of any English sentence embedded to a Twist Operator without 
resorting to any knowledge beyond its syntactic and lexical facts. To get to the extension of any of 
those sentences, however, would have to know the context of utterance, but this applies to all 
languages with indexicals, and, in fact, to all context-sensitive languages.  
 However, one could still argue that this does not really answer the objection: what if 
Botellita Spanish is not a possible human language? What if the Little Sherry Bottle game does not 
even belong to the sphere of natural language? The fact that the Mexican kids’ game is different 
from what Szabó and Thomason consider to be a primary example of a noncompositional language 
constructed on the grounds of a compositional one does not necessarily mean that Botellita Spanish 
belongs to “the sort of languages that normal human beings can acquire under normal social 
conditions as first languages (2009, p. 62).” For it is not uncontended that Botellita Spanish requires 
prior competence with (normal) Spanish: to really play the game, to understand the rules of the 
Twist Operator, one needs to know how indexicals behave in normal, non-ludic conditions. Hence, 
are we not compelled to accept that the Little Sherry Monster is an artificial, unnatural parasite of 
natural Spanish? And would it not be also be a parasite was it added to English? Well, if one accepts 
 
33 Cf. Szabó & Thomason 2019, p. 53. 
34 Note that a language which is not compositional cannot guarantee to preserve substitutivity since this 
principle is a consequence of compositionality. According to Szabó & Thomason: “if there is a function that 
maps the structure of the meaning of the ultimate constituents of a complex expression ∊ to the meaning of 
∊, then replacing one ultimate constituent with a synonymous constituent obviously can’t affect the meaning 
of ∊. (2009, p. 53).” So, it is clear that Baked Spanish violates substitutivity because it violates 
compositionality. On the other hand, it is not so obvious that the Twist Operator violates compositionality, 
at least not until one realises that it violates substitutivity.  
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Szabó’s (2000) claims about compositionality being a law of possible human languages, then it 
follows that Twist is an unnatural creation and does not really threaten Kaplan’s monster 
prohibition but rather enforces it. But what I dispute now is the assumption that Botellita Spanish 
could not be acquired by normal human beings under normal social conditions: 
 First, children (even those as savage as the Mexican variety) are evidently normal human 
beings. Second, I do not believe that language games or ludic linguistic contexts in general constitute 
abnormal social conditions, for even if the apparition of the Sherry Bottle monster most likely 
occurred due to the fertile environment produced by the social practice of Mexican albur, there is 
no reason to believe it cannot be transplanted into a language that lacks such social background; in 
fact, the presence of a similar principle or notion in languages as diverse as Estonian, English and 
Russian would only show that the characteristic social conditions of the Sherry Bottle monster are 
not necessary but merely contingent factors contributing to the development and sustenance of 
such a linguistic monster. Why would we have to think that engaging in a language-game constitutes 
by itself an unnatural linguistic practice? Such an arbitrary border between the natural and the non-
natural aspects of our language calls for further justification.  
 Ultimately, one has to keep in mind that the Twist monster was not begat by elegance but by 
spontaneous, natural (if only a bit childish) ingenuity. This monster was not brought to life by sophisticated 
logicians exploring the expressive possibilities of an artificial linguistic model—as it seems to have 
been Kaplan’s original preoccupation—but by normal, everyday speakers of a natural language. 
More importantly, it was begat by what I would consider the paradigm of natural language speakers: 
children. Therefore, if we accept that when it comes to ludic contexts, the distinction between a 
natural linguistic practice and a non-natural is at best a blurry one that allows for extra 
considerations, we are not compelled to discard the Little Sherry Bottle game for not being an 
authentic part of a natural language.  
 
4. Conclusion: More Than a Children’s Game 
To sum it up, it is plausible to accept that the Little Sherry Bottle Operator is an indexical shifter 
that swaps the referents of ‘I’ and ‘you’. Prima facie objections that pretend to dismiss it either as a 
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quotation device, an implicature trigger, a character shifter or an artificial linguistic practice all have 
been responded to. Furthermore, the rules of the game as well as the truth conditions of its operator 
make sense not only in the Spanish language but also in English. One can easily imagine how simple 
it would be to teach exactly the same game to English-speaking children, and by virtue of doing so, 
introduce a monster into the English language. Therefore, contradicting not only Kaplan’s claim 
that there are no monsters, but most importantly, as it seems that it has not yet been done, his claim 
that they could not be added to English.  
My conclusion then, is that if my argument is correct and the Twist Operator is after all a 
monstrosity, it seems that Kaplan was mistaken about his monster prohibition: there are real 
monsters awaiting out there and letting them into our language is just a child’s game.  Faced with 
this new world of monstrous possibilities, should we keep the monsters off, or should we be ready 
to rethink the relation between indexicals, character, content, and compositionality in the company 















In his seminal work on demonstratives, Kaplan (1989) banned monsters from the realm of natural 
language semantics arguing that the English language does not contain operators that operate on 
linguistic character and, furthermore, that such operators could not be added to it. The first claim 
has been disputed since, giving rise to a monster hunt that led to the discovery of alleged monsters 
in a number of natural languages, and even to monstrous expressions in English. The second claim, 
however, seems to have been just implicitly answered by some of the responses to the first one. 
The goal of this brief paper is to offer a counterexample to that second assertion: the thesis that 
monsters could not be added to English. I claim not only that there are monsters, but that we can introduce 
monsters into the English language. Therefore, this is an essay about the possibility of implementing 
character operators into the English language. In order to do so, I first lay out a framework for a 
monstrous taxonomy. I then point to a very particular monster that terrorises children in Mexico, 
giving a superficial characterisation of it, and finally replying to some possible objections regarding 
its status as a real monster. The moral of this paper is that we only need a bit of wicked, child-like 
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